

Tactics / Techniques / Procedures (TTP) & Grand Strategy



Tactics / Techniques / Procedures (TTP)

&

Grand Strategy

Context and Condition (as of 17 May 2022)


- **The context for this presentation is the War in Ukraine** perpetrated by an invasion of the territory of Ukraine by the Russian Federation and the response by the “West.”
- **The resulting overt warfare began on 24 February 2022** and has continued to the present day. Today is ‘Day 83-84’ of the on-going ‘Special Operation in Ukraine.’
- **Ukraine has acquitted itself admirably** in every way. **Russia has failed** in every way except for its intent to destroy Ukraine's infrastructure. It has accomplished that to some degree – but not without great moral and geo-political cost.
- **Ukraine is ‘winning’ the War** at this point according to most means of assessment. However, the damage to Ukraine as a viable nation-state is hard to overstate. Ukraine will not be the same for many years to come, even if the War ended today. That is also true of Russia and perhaps other nations in the region.
- **On balance, the War in Ukraine has been a disaster for all concerned**, including the United States and NATO. The cost and net effect of the calamity cannot yet be fully stated.
- **Failure to recognize this** in its essential detail and its broadest context is a moral, political, and organizational failure of the greatest significance.
- **Nothing can be done now to undo past events.** One can only hope and pray for an end to the warfare. Meanwhile, there are some emerging lessons to be learned.


Another Part of the Story...

Once bitten...twice shy...

- **Following a [Russian military build-up](#) on the [Russia–Ukraine border](#) from late 2021, the conflict expanded significantly when Russia launched [a full-scale invasion of Ukraine](#) on 24 February 2022.** [Wikipedia](#)
- **The backstory is a long period of build-up, denial, misinformation, disbelief, and clearly stated intent**, depending on conditions and circumstances, to engage in military action against Ukraine for months preceding the invasion.
- **In fact, using a classic definition of ‘strategic deception’** wherein an activity pattern and information flow are publicly displayed so that an opponent is lulled into some measure of skeptical viewpoint – the ‘chicken-little’ syndrome – some measure of ‘surprise’ is achieved when the sky finally does fall.
- **The responsibility for not seeing through this veil of clouded reality falls on all concerned** – but it comes to rest at the doorstep of intelligence services and the leadership they inform.
- **One can argue that there was ‘[strategic warning](#)’ by U.S. and other intelligence services**, and indeed that warning was public and supported by data, but leadership and operational response, notably by Ukraine, did not respond accordingly.
- **Western political leadership did not ‘insist’ on the validity and meaning of the information extant.** That constitutes an intelligence success in the face of operational and leadership failure.

The Dynamics of Decision






DETERRENCE

Indications & Warning at the **STRATEGIC** level are critical to an appropriate response.

Failed deterrence, once brought to culmination cannot be fully controlled nor can the status quo be fully restored. Absent credible deterrence we are at the mercy of those with the **will** to act and the **perception** (misperception) necessary to coalesce their beliefs and decisions into action.



DEVELOPMENTS

- Russian military operations losing momentum.
- Conventional wisdom says Russia will not resort to nuclear weapons.
- War in Ukraine now widely viewed as “Proxy War” between U.S. (NATO) and Russia.
- Russia plagued by technology and operational / tactical failures.
- Finland declares intent to join NATO.
- Sweden announces intent to join NATO.
- McDonald’s will sell all business sites in Russia and leave.
- (Bloomberg) -- Renault SA agreed to transfer its 2.2 billion-euro (\$2.3 billion) Russian business to state entities for a symbolic sum in what amounts to a nationalization triggered by the war in Ukraine.
- Russia makes uneven and incremental gains in Donbas.
- Belarus has deployed forces along the border with Ukraine to try to pin down Ukrainian units which might otherwise be used in the Donbas area.
- Ukraine spokespersons continue to request materiel support of all kinds – especially heavy weapons with longer ranges.
- Agricultural and industrial / materiel shortages are a significant ‘global’ concern.
- Numerous reports of Putin’s ill health, a coup in the offing, and other forms of change.

Beware the old joke: "His brother was worse."



Україна
Ukraine

Л

Russian Bloggers 'Shocked' at Military's 'Incompetence' in Ukraine: Report

Russian mini-bloggers are "shocked" at their military's "incompetence" as Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to push his internationally condemned invasion of Ukraine, a new report said.

Moscow began the full-scale [unprovoked assault](#) on its Eastern European neighbor on February 24, [drawing rapid backlash](#) from the majority of [United Nations](#) General Assembly countries. Although the Kremlin reportedly believed that Russian troops could easily take control of much of Ukraine's territory and topple Ukrainian President [Volodymyr Zelensky](#)'s government, they have largely failed to achieve their objectives.



*"Let me get this straight:
You have lost your flagship, in a land war,
to a force that does not have a navy?"*

TTP Echelons in War

- **Tactical** – Activities carried out by echelons / elements smaller than operating Brigade / Division size units, usually with rapid localized effect. Depending on conditions and circumstances, tactical activities can have strategic impact.
- **Operational** – Activities carried out by echelons / elements larger than tactical units but smaller than operating Armies made up of multi-division Corps structures, with longer effect and greater support requirements. Depending on conditions and circumstances, operational activities will have tactical and strategic impact.
- **Strategic** – Activities carried out by larger and more complex elements of national power, with ‘national’ impact and effect, over a longer period of time and requiring greater coordination among various elements of national power brought to bear on nation-state goals. Depending on conditions and circumstances, strategic activities can have tactical, operational, and grand strategy impact.
- **Grand Strategy** – Activities carried out across a larger spectrum of plans and capabilities which will develop synergy and goal achievement at the highest levels of national security interest, and which will include tactical, operational, and strategic events applied against the larger strategy.
- **Special Activities** – Activities, which by their nature are ‘specialized’ – including special units and personnel, specialized weapons of all kinds, weapons with mass and complex effects (WMCE), and capabilities and capacity which can produce exceptional conditions and results in the context of all other echelons and activities of warfare.

Tactical Issues of Note

Tactical Issues of Note 1

- **Conventional forces arrayed on approaches to and inside the confines of urban areas** are vulnerable to successful attack by new classes of tactically employed missiles and other indirect fire platforms with modern munitions.
- **Conventional forces arrayed in any open spaces and in surface concealment conditions** are vulnerable to being located and successfully attacked using contemporary technologies.
- **Slow / low aircraft** are vulnerable to successful tactical attack by contemporary surface-to-air missiles. This may also be true to fast / high aircraft – but that condition has not developed yet.
- **Ships of all sizes and types** are vulnerable to successful attack by contemporary anti-ship missiles including long and short range missiles.
- **Tactical contemporary heavy weapons** have been employed against all kinds of opposing units, including armored vehicles, with successful effect.
- **Russian Junior Officers and NCOs** do not have the option to change orders or to react to battlespace changes and evolving conditions.

Tactical Issues of Note 2

- **Night vision capabilities** have not proven to be a marked tactical advantage' in this conflict.
- **Cyber / EW and electromagnetic warfare** have not been much in evidence.
- **Unencrypted communication and communication using sustained and boosted signals** (e.g., cellular telephone) provide signatures for discovery and in some cases beacons for guided attack.
- **Chemical warfare** has been alleged and probably has been used in limited ways. Full scientific confirmation has yet to be accomplished. There are no indications of widespread gas or chemical vapors being employed.
- **High caliber sniper weapons and specialized ammunition** have been effectively employed by both sides.
- **Small highly mobile units** – 3-10 combatants – have proven highly effective, vice the less mobile / less flexible and larger groups of combatants employed in traditional 'armored' configurations.
- **Any battlespace task or activity** which develops a discoverable signature – noise, light, reflection, communication, vibration, etc. – can be found and targeted with efficiency and effectiveness.

A U.S. Army paratrooper fires an FGM-148 Javelin shoulder-fired anti-tank missile during a combined arms live-fire exercise at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, August 21, 2019. (Sgt. Henry Villarama)




HOW WESTERN ARTILLERY IS HELPING UKRAINE TARGET RUSSIA FROM GREATER DISTANCE

Range of Soviet-made artillery



Range of artillery Nato countries are sending to Ukraine



Caesar self propelled howitzer has a range of 28.6 miles, M777 towed howitzer range is 24.9 miles VS TOS 1 MRLS range of 2.2 miles, 13.6 miles for D 30 howitzer and 18 miles for 2S19 self propelled howitzer.

[#Ukraine](#) can effectively counter all artillery in range.

We're giving the Ukrainians the HIMAR MLRS. Its range is 186mi.

[Brad Gallardo](#)

Operational Issues of Note

Operational Issues of Note

- **Artillery and Counter-artillery sensors and weapons (and specialized ammunition)** have been successfully employed against a variety of targets including built-up areas and infrastructure and stationary tactical arrays.
- **Missile attacks** have been successfully applied using a variety of missile-delivered capabilities against a variety of targets including built-up areas and infrastructure.
- **Direct attack by aircraft** seems so potentially dangerous to the platform(s) that large-scale air-to-ground operations have not been much in evidence. Stand-off attack from aircraft using missiles has produced effective results.
- **Long-range and large caliber artillery and missile fires** have devastating effect against civilian infrastructure.
- **Massed units** have proven to be more 'target' than 'capability.'
- **As was theorized by DIA in the 1990s** – it is 'impossible' to find a vacant lot to hold a WAR in. In fact, all warfare must include the dynamic and difference of warfare in dense urban zones and its impact on infrastructure and systems.

CYBER

- **MONDAY, MAY 16, 2022**



- **RUSSIA WAS BEHIND CYBERATTACK IN RUN-UP TO UKRAINE WAR, INVESTIGATION FINDS**

- **A cyberattack that took down satellite communications in Ukraine in the hours before the February 24 invasion was the work of the Russian government, the U.S. and European nations said last week. The governments did not explicitly name the organization responsible, but officials reportedly attributed it to the Russian military intelligence agency, the GRU, which was responsible for the 2016 hack of the Democratic National Committee and a range of other attacks on the U.S. and Ukraine.**

Strategic Issues of Note

Strategic Issues of Note

- **Failed leadership** (at every level – including the national leadership of Russia) are obvious in every shortcoming.
- **Western intelligence failed** to discern this ‘internal rot.’
- **Ukraine's leadership** (at every level – including the national leadership of Ukraine) are excellent by any standard.
- **Personal leadership traits** present in the leaders of both Russia and Ukraine are markedly different.
- **Information and perception** once again are key to both success and failure – notably at the strategic level.
- **There have been ‘intelligence failures’ throughout** this sad evolution.
- **Plans and intentions aside, the application of force for moral and just purposes** carries great weight against an immoral and unjust adversary.
- **Geography, time, distance, speed, variation in effect**, and numerous other tried & true elements of WAR have proven once again to be key to how the conduct of warfare will develop...



- [Military Review](#)
- [Analytics](#)

The Russian View on 11 May 2022

With whom and for what Russia is fighting in Ukraine

11 May 2022

98

[With whom and for what Russia is fighting in Ukraine \(topwar.ru\)](#)

“The military conflict in Ukraine is expanding more and more and is taking on the scale of a global confrontation between Russia and the West. The protracted nature of the conflict is facilitated by the formation of an anti-Russian front under the leadership of the United States in the military, political, economic, information spheres, unprecedented financial assistance to the Kyiv regime and the massive supply of all kinds of [weapons](#). All these factors indicate that a private special operation in Ukraine is beginning to develop into a Patriotic battle between Russia and the West.”

The 'Russian Way of Warfare'

- **The so-called 'Russian Way of Warfare,'** is much on display in this conflict. The idea is to pummel the enemy into submission by repeated strikes against the infrastructure (including incidentally the civilian populace). This approach has worked in some ways – much infrastructure has been destroyed; the disruption of the populace has been accomplished. Agricultural and industrial production have been adversely affected. The loss of life is certain to have a lasting effect.
- **However, in the case of Ukraine,** so far, this approach has strengthened Ukrainian resolve and made it unlikely that Russia will achieve much of their desired outcome or their beginning goals.
- **One can make a valid case** that by attacking civilian infrastructure (and people caught in the areas of attack), the result has been to harden the resolve of the Ukrainians and their [NATO] allies. The indiscrete attack by Russian forces and their many reported violations of the Laws of Land Warfare and associated humanitarian concerns – have made it unlikely that they will be able to leave this War in any way, even if they lose outright, or even if they win outright, without lasting adverse effect and global condemnation.
- **One likely outcome** – no matter what the intervening events might be – is that Russia (its government, its economy, and its people...) will become destabilized and will act erratically and unpredictably in ways that will affect the rest of the world.

POLICY & PROCEDURE

Public Disclosure of **SECRET** Info

- **Conventional wisdom** holds that you should never reveal friendly stratagems for achieving or preventing the rise or expansion of great power among nation-states. One may communicate 'too much information' in the process.
- **Other considerations** sometimes indicate that some measure of disclosure about stratagems may be both appropriate and helpful.
- **The balance between fruitful and perilous disclosure** is filled with nuance and subtlety, with artful statecraft and bungling, and with political and societal risk.
- **In the end**, telling your enemy or your friend what you may wish for them as an outcome to whatever relationship you may have – may not meet their goals, their desires, and their expectations.
- **The lesson to be learned** is that when you have a choice, any communication can and perhaps should be done in private, using diplomatic or other relationship channels.
- **Public disclosure through media interaction** is almost always ill-advised.
- **The same conventional wisdom applies to the enemy's stratagems.** Never tell them what you know about them unless on balance it seems to benefit friendly strategic goals.
- **The disclosure of SECRET intelligence in the public domain**, especially when not properly administered, can and often will lead to two outcomes: (1) the original source(s) will be compromised, and (2) the disclosure [once] will lead to [multiple expectations of additional disclosure], potentially weakening the systemic protection of the intelligence system.

Disclosure of the Enemy's Stratagems

“Putin may use nuclear weapons...”

US intelligence chiefs warned the Senate on Tuesday that Vladimir Putin may use nuclear weapons as a last resort if he feels that Russia will be defeated in Ukraine.

Top US intelligence chief Avril Haines told the Senate that Putin might see defeat in Ukraine as "an existential threat to his regime," as reported by the **BBC**.

The US intelligence chiefs believe that the situation in Ukraine will be a war of attrition. They told the Senate that Putin hopes to conquer the Luhansk and Donetsk regions and a buffer zone around them to create a land bridge for Russia to Crimea.

Haines also said that Putin might be working on more ambitious plans. The director of national intelligence said there have been "indications" that the Russian president may also hope to take hold of all of Ukraine's Black Sea coast.


One must ask, now, what would the effect and outcome be, from Russia's use of nuclear weapon, no matter where, when, or how it was used?

The Evolution of the “WAR” in Ukraine



WAR IN UKRAINE

RUSSIA's PATHWAY



WAR IN UKRAINE

UKRAINE'S PATHWAY



GLOBAL CHANGE

The War is Not Just in the Ukraine

- **Some are now beginning to characterize this ‘conflict’ as a ‘proxy war’** between the Russian Federation and associated nations and the United States and their associated nations, especially those that fit into the NATO family of countries.
- **China and some other nations** are characterized circumstantially as not (NOT) supporting Russia – but they have provided ‘de facto’ support by not condemning Russia’s actions. More information about their supportive actions will be developed over time.
- **In some cases some nations have taken steps that may seem more like self-serving actions** with consequences that may incidentally (or directly) benefit Russia.
- **The impressive unified action and resolve of NATO nations and other like-minded countries may hold** – but the possibilities for vacillation and change should be considered in light of other motivating factors that have a more immediate and direct effect on the interests of the nations or regions involved.

Internal divisions exist...

China comes out of this turmoil stronger

Pandemic effects?

KN comes out of this turmoil weakened but dangerous



Russia comes out of this turmoil weaker and fundamentally changed...

Desperation factor is key to future..

Internal divisions exist...

Iran comes out of this turmoil weaker but dangerous

INFORMATION & MISINFORMATION



TACC

Naval Base Target In Chinese Desert

MAXAR



After Impact

Metal sheets creating outline

Impact in center of ship

Before Impact

Circular target with multiple impact marks



Above — U.S. Marine with M1 carbine, Guam, 1944. U.S. Marine Corps photo. At top — M2 carbine. Joe Mabel photo



NASHVILLE, Tenn. (WSMV) - **Elements of the 101st Airborne Division have been ordered to deploy to Europe according to a Pentagon announcement today.**



© Provided by WSMV Nashville's

Headquarters, 101st Ban. Div. and the 2nd Brigade Combat Team have been notified to begin movement to Europe as soon as this summer. The deploying units will join V Corps in support of commitment to Europe and NATO Allies as part of the ongoing response to the invasion of Ukraine.

"Over the last six months we conducted two division-wide training exercises, greatly increasing the readiness of our Soldiers, units, and Families," said Maj. Gen. JP McGee, the Commanding General of the 101st Ban. Div. "As we have for the last 80 years, the 101st Airborne Division stands ready to deploy anywhere to support and defend the Nation and our Allies."

"The contributions and sacrifices that our Families make in support of our Soldiers are critical to our success," said McGee. "They are an integral part of the Screaming Eagle Team and we are committed to supporting them while deployed."

Copyright 2022 WSMV. All rights reserved.

Ukraine Might Get German IRIS-T SLM Medium-Range SAM System: Reports



“The truck-mounted system has a multifunction radar, the ability to track multiple targets at once, and is designed to hit strategic bombers, fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, anti-radiation missiles, cruise missiles, guided bombs, drones, and large-caliber rockets. The missile is directed towards its target via a datalink.”

Ukrainian soldiers in their armed battle UTVs. (Weapons on Twitter/)



[The Drive](#) reports that the Ukrainian military has been using UTVs, thought to be [Polaris Rangers](#) and Polaris MRZR Alphas, armed with Stugna-P antitank guided missiles to combat Russian tanks. These antitank guided missiles, or ATGMs, can be mounted on vehicles, shouldered, or launched from the ground.



© Pierre Crom/Getty Images A mural praises the Russian Wagner group and its mercenaries fighting in Ukraine on March 30, 2022 in Belgrade, Serbia. Pierre Crom/Getty Images



© ORN E. BORGEN/NTB scanpix/AFP via Getty Images Members of neo-nazi organization Nordic Resistance Movement hold their banners during a demonstration on October 27, 2018 in Fredrikstad, some 90 km south of Oslo. ORN E. BORGEN/NTB scanpix/AFP via Getty Images

The Jerusalem Post



Israel agrees to equip Ukraine with Blue Spear system through Estonia - report



Estonia, which purchased an unspecified number of Blue Spear systems from its manufacturer Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) in October 2021, asked Israel for its authorization to transfer one of the systems to Ukraine's Armed Forces, currently defending Ukraine against [the Russian invasion](#).

[Israel agrees to equip Ukraine with Blue Spear system through Estonia - report \(msn.com\)](#)

It is a mistake to think that everyone in Ukraine...is pro-Ukraine in a contemporary and singular sense.

There are many divisions and nuances of political and historical-cultural belief. Some ideas include affiliation with Russia and make contemporary reference to Tsarist Beliefs and constructs.

Ukraine's Kherson region to request accession into Russia - UK

By REUTERS

The Russian-imposed military-civilian administration in Ukraine's Kherson region said it will ask Russia to include it in the Russian Federation, the British defense ministry said on Saturday.

If Russia carries out an accession referendum in Kherson, it will almost certainly manipulate the results to show a clear majority in favor of leaving Ukraine, Britain said in a regular Twitter bulletin.

[Ukraine's Kherson region to request accession into Russia - UK \(msn.com\)](#)



Pro-Russian separatism

According to a 2016 report by [Institut français des relations internationales](#) (IFRI), [Russian ethnic and imperialist nationalism](#) has shaped the official ideology of the [Donetsk](#) and [Luhansk](#) People's Republics,^[26] the two self-proclaimed states controlled by [pro-Russian separatists](#) but internationally recognized as part of Ukraine. During the [War in Donbas](#), far-right groups played an important role on the pro-Russian side, arguably more so than on the Ukrainian side.^{[26][27]}

Members and former members of [National Bolshevik Party](#), [Russian National Unity](#) (RNU), [Eurasian Youth Union](#), and the Cossack units along with other groups actively participated in starting branches for the recruitment of the separatists.^{[26][28][29][30]} A former member of RNU, [Pavel Gubarev](#), was founder of the Donbas People's Militia and first "governor" of the Donetsk People's Republic.^{[26][31]} RNU is particularly linked to the [Russian Orthodox Army](#),^[26] one of a number of separatist units described as "pro-Tsarist" and "extremist" Orthodox nationalists.^[32] Neo-Nazi units such as the 'Rusich', 'Svarozhich' and 'Ratibor' battalions, use [Slavic swastikas](#) on their badges.^[26] 'Rusich' is part of the [Wagner Group](#), a Russian mercenary group in Ukraine which has been linked to far-right extremism.^{[33][34]} Some of the most influential nationalists and far-right activists among the Russian separatists are neo-imperialists, who seek to revive the [Russian Empire](#).^[26] These included [Igor 'Strelkov' Girkin](#), first "minister of defence" of the Donetsk People's Republic, who espouses Russian neo-imperialism and ethno-nationalism.^[26] The [Russian Imperial Movement](#), a [white supremacist](#) militant group,^[33] has recruited thousands of volunteers to join the separatists.^[32] Some separatists have flown the black-yellow-white Russian imperial flag,^[26] such as the [Sparta Battalion](#). In 2014, volunteers from the [National Liberation Movement](#) joined the Donetsk People's Militia bearing portraits of [Tsar Nicholas II](#).^[35]

Other Russian volunteers involved in separatist militias included members of the [Eurasian Youth Union](#), and of banned groups such as the [Slavic Union](#) and the [Movement Against Illegal Immigration](#).^[29] Another Russian separatist paramilitary unit, the [Interbrigades](#), is made up of activists from the [National Bolshevik](#) (Nazbol) group [Other Russia](#).^[26] ^{Wikipedia}

The Special Operations Detachment "Azov" ([Ukrainian](#): Окремий загін спеціального призначення «Азов», [romanized](#): *Okremyi zahin spetsialnoho pryznachennia "Azov"*), also known as the **Azov Regiment** ([Ukrainian](#): Полк «Азов», [romanized](#): *Polk "Azov"*) and until September 2014^[a], **Azov Battalion** ([Ukrainian](#): батальйон «Азов», [romanized](#): *Bataliyon "Azov"*), is a [neo-Nazi](#)^{[6][7]} unit of the [National Guard of Ukraine](#) based in [Mariupol](#) in the coastal region of the [Sea of Azov](#), from where it derives its name.^[8] Azov formed as a volunteer paramilitary militia in May 2014,^[9] and has since been fighting [Russian forces](#) in the [Donbas War](#). It first saw combat [recapturing Mariupol](#) from Russian forces and pro-Russian separatists in June 2014.^[3] It initially operated as a volunteer police company, until it was formally incorporated into the National Guard on 11 November 2014.^{[10][11][5]} **In the wake of the [2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine](#), the battalion gained renewed attention for its use by Russia in justifying the invasion and during the [Siege of Mariupol](#) for its role in the defense of the city.**^[12] **The battalion drew controversy over allegations of [torture](#) and [war crimes](#),**^{[13][14]} **as well as association with neo-Nazi ideology.**^{[15][16]} **Azov uses controversial symbols, including a variation of the [Wolfsangel](#) insignia used by divisions of the [Waffen-SS](#) and [Wehrmacht](#) during [World War II](#).**^{[17][18][19][20][21][22]} **In March 2015, a spokesman for the Azov Battalion, told [USA Today](#) that only 10% to 20% of the group's members are Nazis.**^[23] **At various points, lawmakers in the US and Canada have blocked its receipt of arms due to its far right links. These links have also led to a focus on the unit in Russian propaganda: one of the reasons given by [President of Russia Vladimir Putin](#) for the 2022 invasion was the 'denazification' of Ukraine, to remove the alleged control of far right forces such as Azov over the country.**

In 2017, the size of the regiment was estimated at more than 2,500 members,^[2] but was estimated to have 900 members in 2022.^[24] Members of the battalion came from 22 countries and are of various backgrounds.^{[25][26]} Its founder and early commander was [Andriy Biletsky](#).

[Wikipedia](#)







Paradigm Shift?

So far, much of what has been publicized about this War seems to me to be a gross oversimplification of what is a complicated mesh of dynamic open-source information-ever-changing politics-obscure economics- opaque strategy - evolving technology - ancient culture - misunderstood history and virtually every other feature and facet of contemporary contextual condition(s) and circumstance(s), often empirically derived and subject to misperception, thrown headlong into the intelligence stewpot, out of which one may not (may not) expect absolute truth. One may (and should) expect mistakes in judgement, errant viewpoint, and flawed data, to name a few expected variations on the construct of intelligence success juxtaposed against operational & leadership failure. *PMH*

Thank You
For Your Kind Attention